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IN 'THE SUPREME~ COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAYMOND B. MAXFIELD, 
P laintvff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
vVESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8854 
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the court below. ,-
All italics are ours. 
FACTS 
This lawsuit .arose from an injury which Plaintiff 
received on July 25, 1955, approximately 8 n1iles west 
of Green River, Utah, on U.S. Highway No. 50 and 6. 
The lawsuit was filed under the provisions of the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 51, et seq. 
The injuries to plaintiff resulted when a railroad 
truck in which he was a pa.ssenger in the hack tipped 
over throwing him out (R. 23). He testified that most 
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of the impact received from being thrown out of the back 
of the truck was to his left shoulder and that he felt a 
great amount of pain in the left shoulder from the time 
of the injury. Plaintiff was taken to the hospital,at Price, 
Utah, where he remained for approximately eight days. 
He was treated by Dr. Hubbard who found that his 
shoulder had been dislocated. The doctor immediately 
took x-r.ays and re-set the shoulder after giving plaintiff 
an anaesthetic (R. 24, 108, 119). Plaintiff had never had 
any trouble with his left shoulder prior to July 25, 1955 
(R. 23, 34). I-Iis left arm was bound tight to his side 
until a day or two before he left the hospital at which 
time a splint was placed on his .arm. Plaintiff was re-
leased from the hospital \Yith instructions not to raise 
his arm too n1uch (R. 24-25). Subsequently Maxfield was 
seen by Dr. Hubbard in the doctor's office on August 12, 
16 and 23 and September 6 and 27. The doctor released 
him for \Vork on October 1, 1955 (R. 110). Plaintiff has 
suffered p.ain in his left shoulder e\er since the accident 
(R. ~7, 33). 
Jfaxfie ld first becan1e acquainted \Yith Stephen, the 
elain1 agent of defendant \vhile l1e \Yas recuperating at 
honH\ "~hen Stephen ea1ne to his house to see him 
(H .. ~G). --:\t a later date Stephen took plaintiff to the 
scPne oF the areident .and obtained inforn1ation from hnn 
:u~ to ho" .. thP aeeident happened. On one of these visits 
NtPphPn told plaintiff that if he needed Inoney he could 
:ulv;lJH•<\ hi111 sonlP (R .. ~()).On Septe1nber 10, 1955, Step-
]JPil gav<\ pln inti ff a clH:'\ek in the an1ount of $200.00 and 
ltn<l hint ~ign an ngreen1ent (Ex. P-1). This .agreeinen1 
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provided, among other things, that plaintiff agreed that 
said advancement would not be considered as an admis-
sion of liability on the part of the Railroad Company 
and that he agreed with the Railroad Company that he 
would endeavor, in good faith, to adjust and settle any 
claim for his injuries without resorting to ligitation. 
On October 1st when plaintiff had been released by 
the doctor to go back to work he went to Stephen's office 
at the Grand Junction Railroad Yards and had a con-
versation with him in regard to the settlement of his 
case. Stephen offered plaintiff a settlement of $710.00 
which was payment of lost w:ages for his time off work. 
Maxfield complained .of this offer stating that he did not 
think it was a just settlement inasmuch as he was paid 
nothing for his pain and suffering which he was still 
having .at that time. He then stated that he informed 
Stephen that he, plaintiff, was thinking of getting a 
lawyer and that maybe he could get more that way. In 
response to this Stephen stated ''You will lose your job 
and it will take months for a procedure of that kind 
.anyway". After this, plaintiff accepted the settlement 
because "I will take what I can get then because I don't 
want to lose my job" (R. 30). At that time Stephen 
typed up the release and had Maxfield sign it, giving 
him in return a check in the sum of $510.00 (Ex. P-2). 
DT. Hubbard testified that in a case such as this 
he would not anticipate a permanent injury and that he 
did not anticip.ate any permanent injury in this particu-
lar case (R. 111). l-Ie stated (R. 110): 
''A. No. I thought it was just a normal treatment 
for a dislocated left shoulder, and the man 
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went back to work with no complications. 
There were no complications at all". 
The plaintiff testified (R. 32): 
'' Q. Now tell me, did you have any idea at tliat 
time that you had a permanent injury in your 
shoulder~ 
A. No, Sir." 
Speaking of the time when the release was signed, 
October 1, 1955, Stephen testified (R. 91): 
"Q. At the time you made this settlement it was 
your idea that he had no permanent disa-
bility, wasn't it~ 
A. As far as I know that is right." 
Dr. Reed Smoot Clegg, a local orthopedic surgeon, 
testified that he examined plaintiff in his office on July 
5, 1957, and January 24, 1958, and that x-rays of plain-
tiff's left shoulder were taken on both occasions (R. 65). 
Dr. Clegg testified that the x-ra·ys showed a callus or 
bone deposit in the region of the shoulder bone on the 
upper end of the hu1nerus, or arn1 bone. This formation 
had the appearance on the x-rays of a lmob (Ex. P-3, 
P-4). Dr. Clegg further testified that tlris callus deposit 
usually occurs after so1ne kind of .an injury and that it 
usually 1nanifests itself 'Yith the con1plaint of pain and 
tPnderness in that area and that occasionally there is 
~onte secondary "Tt>.akness because the injured person 
seen1~ to favor it. In his opinion plaintiff had incurred 
a lOj~ per111anent partial disability in his left shoulder 
based on the fact that there is still slight 'Yeakness, 
tenderness and a deposit of bone .about the shoulder 
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joint (R. 66-'67). Dr. Clegg further testified that assum-
ing prior to July 25, 1955, plaintiff had never had any 
complaints or limitations in his left shoulder and that 
on said date he was thrown out of .an overturned truck 
and landed on his left shoulder and suffered a disloca-
tion and that the dislocation was reduced at the hospital 
and that ever since that time and at the present time 
plaintiff has pain in his shoulder and with the exami-
nations that he had performed and the x-rays that he 
had taken, in his ·Opinion that type of injury pro b.ably 
caused the disability which plaintiff has (R. 67). Dr. 
Clegg further testified that the callus formation would 
restrict motion in the extreme ranges (R. 71). 
Dr. Hubbard, an employee of respondent's hospital 
association, came from Price, Utah, where he practices, 
to testify. On the witness stand he exhibited an antagon-
istic, argumentative and biased attitude in favor of the 
Railroad which is exhibited to some degree in the fol-
lowing testimony ( R. 119) : 
"Q. You gave him an anaesthetic~ 
A. You have to do that. 
Q. Why did you do that~ 
A. So I wouldn't hurt the man, but I have re-
duced a hundred shoulders without anything. 
Q. I understand, but in this case you didn't, did 
you~ 
A. I think I could have done it with Raymond 
Q. I understand, but you did give it, didn't you~ 
A. Of course, that is an exceptional-
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Q. Did you or didn't you~ 
A. I gave him an anaesthetic, a mild, a very mild 
Anaesthesia, not an anaesthetic, a mild ana-
esthesia. 
Q. What did you give him~ 
A. Well, you might call it semi-comatose. See, 
they are partially conscious. 
Q. And he would feel it~ 
A. I guess he would feel it a little. 
Q. Why did you give it to him~ 
A. To relax him." 
(R. 121-122) 
'' Q. In other words, Mr. Maxfield, at the time 
you took that bandage off, had absolutely no 
pain at all' 
A. That is right. 
Q. And he could move that whole arm any way 
around? 
A. I ·will tell you "~hy. 
:nrR .... A .. SHTON: ''11:~ don't you let him 
tell you "~hy? 
.A.. ..A. dislocation isn't a fr.acture. ...A.. dislocation, 
you put bark "'"hat God placed there. It i~ not 
broken ; it is nothing. A ballplayer has a 
fingt\r pulled out, a dislocated finger. Doesn't 
he go and play~ Sure he does. 
Q. Just a 1ninute. 
A. I ha.ve studied .anatomy and surgery and you 
haven't. 
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THE COURT: Wait a minute, Doctor. 
Let's don't argue. 
THE WITNESS: Excuse me, Judge 
Hanson. 
THE ,C:OURT: Just answer his ques-
tions. 
THE WITNESS: All right. Yes. 
Q. (By Mr. Roberts) Just be seated. Just be 
seated, Doctor." 
Also, Dr. Hubbard testified that all persons over 
40 years of age vvould hurt in their shoulder on moving 
their arms to the extreme position. DT. Hubbard stated 
at (R. 123): 
'' Q. Doctor, at the age of fifty I am supposed to 
hurt when I go like this, if that is right ( illus-
trating). 
A. If you .are playing basketball I think it would 
bind up quite quickly. 
Q. I am not saying that. When I move in the 
extremes I am supposed to hurt~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Everybody over forty years old~ 
A. Yes." 
At the close of the evidence plaintiff's counsel made 
a motion to .amend as follows (R .. 128): 
''MR. ROBERTS: We move at this time to 
amend to conform to the proof in connection with 
the evidence that was introduced in the case about 
a mutual mistake of fact, which was present if 
the claim agent and the plaintiff testified that 
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at the time they made the settlement that they 
were under the impression there was no penna-
nent injury.'' 
This motion was granted by the court and mutual 
mistake of fact was given to the jury as well as fraud 
and undue influence. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE "PREPONDERANCE'' RULE IS THE ESTABLISHED 
FEDERAL RULE FOR PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN IN A VOID-
ING A RELEASE. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED PLAIN-
TIFF TO AMEND HIS ·COMPLAINT AND PROPERLY IN-
STRUCTED THE JURY ON MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT. 
POINT III. 
THE GROSS UNFAIRNESS OF A SETTLEMENT IS A 
PROPER MATTER FOR THE JURY TO CONSIDER IN CON-
NE·CTION WITH PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE AS TO UNDUE 
INFLUEN·CE EXERCISED UPON Hll\1 BY DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIM AGENT. 
.A.RGU)IE~T 
POINT I. 
THE "PREPONDERANCE'' RULE IS THE ESTABLISHED 
FEDERAL RULE FOR PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN IN AVOID-
ING A RELEASE. 
It is adJnitt<?d that the Federal La\v is controlling 
a~ to this quc'~tion. Defendant relies entirely upon the 
ea~<' of I\ irthgcstue r r. De-n re r & RZ:.o Grand c TTr ester1t 
ll. Il. (~a. dPcided ]\fay 17 1950, 118 U. 20, 218 P. 2d 685, 
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for establishing the Federal la\v on this question. A 
review of the recent developments in the Federal L,aw 
on this subject will show that the Kirchgestner case is 
no longer controlling. In its decision on rehearing at 
118 U. 41, 233 P. 2d 699 June 19, 1951, the Supreme 
Court ·of Utah referred to Federal Law cited in its 
decision granting a rehearing at 118 U. 37, 225 P. 2d 754. 
It there appears that the Utah Supreme Court relied 
on the c.ase of Callen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 3rd 
Cir. 162 F. 2d 832, and on appeal to the Supreme Court 
of the United States at 332 U.S. 625, 68 S. Ct. 296, 92 L. 
Ed. 242. In the Callen case the trial judge instructed the 
jury that the release was not binding as to permanent 
injuries suffered by the plaintiff. The Third Circuit 
Court, on appeal, reversed the trial court for the reason 
that the release issued was not presented to the jury and 
stated that the proper rule was the clear, unequivocal 
and convincing rule. The Circuit c·ourt opinion was ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. The 
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the de-
cision of the Third Circuit Court on the ground that the 
plaintiff had the burden of proving fraud or mutual 
mistake and that the question should have been given 
to the jury to decide. However, in its opinion the 
Supreme Court made no statement whatsoever as to 
whether the burden was by a preponderance or by clear, 
unequivocal and convincing evidence. 
It is interesting to note that there was a four judge 
dissent consisting of Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy 
and Rutledge in which it was stated that Federal Em-
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ployers Liability Act cases should be governed by the 
same rule which applies to releases by seamen in Admir-
ality Cases, which is that the defendant would have the 
burden of proving that the release was not obtained by 
fraud. Thus, two of the judges who are now on tlie 
Supreme Court, Black and Douglas, would have an even 
more liberal rule for plaintiffs in F .E.L.A. cases than 
the preponderance of the evidence rule. \"\T e desire to 
make special note of this fact at this time so that it may 
be borne in mind during the following discussion of later 
developments in the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Over seven months after the decision on rehearing 
in the Kirchgestner case, on February 4, 1952, the Su-
preme Court of the United States ruled on the case 
of Dice u. Akron, Canton & Y oungstozrn R. R. Co. 342 
U.S. 359, 72 S. Ct. 312. In the Dice case the trial judge 
applied the procedure of the State of Ohio to an F.E.L.A. 
ra~e in trying the issue .as to the validity of the release 
~0parately as a court of equity. The trial court held that 
there 'Yas no clear, unequiYocal and convincing evidence 
of fraud. The 1najority opinion in the Dice case was 
'Yritt0n bY Justice Blaek and announced bY Justice 
. . 
Douglas holding that the trial court in trying the re-
lPaf;P issue as a eourt of equity~ had denied a jury trial 
to pln in tiff to 'rhieh ht"\ " .. as entitled under the Federal 
~~~tnployerfi Liability _.:\ct. Justice Frankfurter along 'Yith 
,J ustie<'fi H,Ped~ tT.nekson and Burton concurred in the 
rPv<')r~al of tht' Diet' ease for a different reason. In a 
~Pparah) <)pinion Jnstiee Frankfurter concurred in re-
ver~al ror the reason that the trial court had applied 
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the rule .of clear, unequivoc.al and convincing evidence 
and stated at page 318 : 
"Such proof of fraud need be only by a pre-
ponderance of the relevant evidence. See Union 
Pacific Railroad Co. vs. Harris, 158 U.S. 326, 15 
S. Ct. 843, 39 L. Ed. 1003. '' 
Thus, it can be seen from the special opinion of 
Justice Fr.ankfurter in the Dice case that Justices Frank-
furter, Reed, Jackson and Burton agreed that the pre-
ponderance rule applied in F.E.L.A. cases. It may be 
noted that undoubtedly at least Justices Black and 
Douglas who were on the majority side in the Dice case 
would .agree with the rule as stated by Justice Frank-
furter as opposed to the clear, unequivocal and convinc-
ing rule inasmuch as in the Callen case both of these 
Justices had spoken out for a rule even more liberal for 
the plaintiff than the preponderance of the evidence rule, 
that is, they would place upon the Railroad the burden 
of proving the release was not tainted by fraud. 
It may be noted at this time that the case of Un~on 
Pacif~c R. Co. v. Flarris, cited by Justice Frankfurter, 
indicates that the Federal rule is the preponder.ance of 
the evidence rule. This was a case brought in a Federal 
Court for personal injuries received by plaintiff while 
he was a passenger on defendant's train. There was .a 
release issue involved in the case. The trial court in-
structed the jury that plaintiff was not bound by the 
release if his mind "\vas in such condition from drugs and 
whiskey that he could not underst.and what he was doing 
or if he understood the settlement was for only medical 
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expenses and loss of time and he did not read the release 
because p·rostrated by the accide·nt. In the trial court's 
instructions, reviewed by the Supreme Court, the tria] 
court, in effect, told the jury ''if you believe certain 
facts then the plaintiff is not bound by the release". At 
no time did the trial court state that the plaintiff had to 
show these facts by clear and convincing evidence. In 
speaking in the normal manner concerning these things 
it is inescapable that the trial court was applying the 
preponderance of the evidence rule. If it had applied 
the clear and convincing rule it would have so stated. 
By approving the instructions given as the:~ , ..... ere, it can 
be reasoned that the Supreme Court approved of the 
preponderance of the evidence rule. Certainly this is 
what Justice Frankfurter thought when he cited this 
case as authority in the Dice decision. 
Subsequent to the Dice case, on August 4, 1952, the 
Third Circuit Court of .A_ppeals decided the case of 
Purvrs v. Pennsylvanz;a Ry. Co. 198 F. 2d, 631. It can be 
noted that this is the san1e Circuit Court which had 
earlier decided the Callen case holding that the Federal 
rule was the clear, unequiYocal and eonvincing rule. In 
Purvis the trial court had held that even though the 
broad issue \\~as correctly an issue to be decided by the 
jury, the endorse1nent on the back of the cheek received 
hy- the plaintiff beneath release language printed on the 
ha<~.k of the cheek eonstituted a ratification of the release 
·and accordingly set aside .a verdict and judgn1ent in 
favor of the- plaintiff. The Cireuit Court held that this 
\Va~ not eorrect and that the endorsen1ent of the check 
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was not a separate transaction. The Court then went 
on to set at rest ,any doubt that there may have been 
concerning the question of what plaintiff's burden of 
proof is in order to set aside a release. The court, on 
page 633, discussed the history of this law and adopted 
the preponderance of the evidence rule. The court stated: 
"Until Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. R. Co. :x· :x· * 
it had been assumed that the Federal rule w,as 
that the evidence had to be clear, unequivocal 
and convincing. * * * That test was followed by 
us in Callen v. Pennsylvania R. C'o. 162 F. 2d 832. 
Callen was affirmed by the Supreme Court * * *, 
but the above precise question was not formally 
passed upon by the court. * * *Mr. Justice Frank-
furter who had been of the majority in Callen 
wrote the dissenting opinion in Dice. * * * Mr. 
Justice Jackson, who wrote the Callen decision, 
Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Burton joined 
with him. The dissent agreed with the majority 
on reversal but thought that the case should be 
returned for further proceedings'* * * on the sole 
question of fraud in the release.' * * * and Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter went on to say that, 'such 
proof of fraud need be ,only by a preponderance 
of relevant evidence.' 
"We are satisfied that if and when the prob-
lem is squarely before the Supreme Court the 
rule pronounced will be in .accord with Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter's above quoted language and there-
fore, in fairness to the district judges of this 
Circuit and t:o ourselves, we adopt that test for 
this ,Circuit in applicable instances.'' 
It can be seen that in the Purvis case the indication 
of the Supreme Court of the United States as to its 
feelings on this question was so strong that the Third 
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Circuit Court reversed itself on its holding in the Callen 
case. It may also be noted that the Callen case was the 
case on which the Supreme Court :of Utah relied in 
arriving at its holding in the Kirchgestner case. Certi-
orari w.as denied in the Purvis case at 344 U.S. 898, 97 
L. Ed. 694, 73 S. Ct. 278. The Supreme c·ourt of the 
United States has cited the Purvis case with approval 
in the case of South Buffalo Ry. Co. v. Gertrude Sloan 
Ahern, 34,! U.S. 367, 97 L. Ed. 395, 73 S. Ct. 340 (1952). 
This case involved a question of the validity of a la\v 
in New York providing that a claimant under F.E.L.A. 
could waive his rights and proceed under Workmen's 
Compensation Law in New York. The court held that the 
law, being permissive rather than coersive, did not un-
constitutionally conflict with the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act. In discussing generally the nature of a rail-
roader's rights under F.E.L.A. Justice Clark stated at 
401: 
''To be sure, peculiarities of local law may 
not gnaw at rights rooted in federal legislation. 
(Citing cases) * * * Untainted by fraud or over-
reaching, full and fair compromises of F.E.L.A. 
claims do not clash 'vith the policy· of the Act. 
Callen v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 332 U.S. 625, 92 L. 
Ed. 242, 68 S. Ct. 296 (1948). The validity of such 
an agreement, however, raises a federal question 
to be resolved by federalla,Y-. (Citing cases) * * * 
and, 111 indful of the benevolent ailns of the Act, 
we have jealously scrutinized private arrange-
lllPnts for the bartering H.\\~ay of federal rights. 
(Citing cases 'l~nclud£ng the Purvi:s case). 
AftP r th P Purvis case, in 1952, the Circuit Court of 
Appeals f.or the First Circuit decided the case of Cam-
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erUn v. New York ~Cent. R. Co. 199 F. 2d 698. This case 
involved validity of a release in an F.E.L.A. case. The 
plaintiff had testified in a deposition, among other 
things, that the claim agent represented that plaintiff 
was entitled only to Workmen's Compensation benefits 
at the rate of $25.00 per week for his time off. The trial 
judge granted a summary judgment based on the testi-
mony of plaintiff in his depostion. On appeal the cases 
cited by defendant in support of the summary judgment 
rendered by the trial court were all cases which had 
held that the rule was that plaintiff had the burden of 
setting asiqe the release by clear, unequivocal and con-
vincing evidence. The court stated at p1age 704: 
''This may have been the rule at one time 
but, at least as applied to cases under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act, we take the federal rule 
now to be, as was indicated in the recent case 
·of Purvis v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. 3 Cir. 1952, 
198 F. 2d '631, that it is enough if the employee 
establishes, by a preponderance of the relevant 
evidence, the facts invalidating the release. '' 
The Purvis case has also been followed by the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota in the case of Allison v. 
Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. (1954) 62 NW 2d 37 4. 
This was an action to recover for personal injuries in 
which the defendant s.et up a release as a defense. The 
trial court instructed that plaintiff's burden in upsetting 
the release was by a fair preponderance of the evidence. 
The jury awarded a verdict for plaintiff and the trial 
court entered judgment for defendant notwithstanding 
the verdict. One of the questions on appeal was whether 
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the burden was by a preponderance of the evidence or 
by cle~ar, certain and unequivocal evidence. The court 
stated at page 379: 
"It seems clear under the latest federal de-
cisions that the applicable rule governing the 
weight of evidence essential to the avoidance of 
.a release for mistake or fraud, under the Federul 
Employers' Liability Act, is the 'fair preponder-
ance' rather than the 'clear unequivocal and con-
vincing' evidence rule.' ' 
The court proceeds to review the Dice case and the 
Purvis and Ca1nerlin cases and states at page 380: 
''In accordance ·with the rule expressed in 
these late decisions, we must apply the 'fair pre-
ponderance' rule in weighing the evidence here 
presented.'' 
It n1ay be pointed out that a rene,,- of Shepards 
R-eporter Citations subsequent to the Purris ease sho-ws 
that there has been no instance "-hatsoever where a 
suh~equent ease has n1odified in the least the decision 
In the PurYis ease. 
It is r<'~pectfull~- sub1nitted that the federal la"- is 
"-hat t hP Supre1ne ('~ourt of the lTnited State8 says it is. 
11 i~ obYion~ fron1 foregoing that the Supre1ne Court of 
thP lTnitPd ~tatPs has clear!~- spoken its preference for 
1 he 1) I~eponderanc<' rult'. The faet that Justices Douglas 
and BJ:tek "·ere on tlH' nutjorit~- opinion of the Diee case 
nnd 1hl\rpfor<' "·t'rt:) not required to state their Yie\YS 
n~ to thi~ i~~lH' .and in Yie,,- of their stand on the Callen 
e.:t~P \VhPr<\ in t]H' dissPnt they held that the rule should 
hP PYt'll 1nore lih<'ral than the preponderance rule 1nakes 
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it certain that at least two judges In addition to the 
four on the Dice dissent would hold for the preponder-
ance rule as opposed to the clear, unequivocal and con-
vincing rule. Furthermore, the fact that the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in the Purvis case and cited the 
Purvis case with approval in the Ahern case is a further 
indication of its feeling as to this question of law. The 
Third Circuit Court in the Purvis case reversed its own 
decision in the c~allen case on the strength of the Dice 
case and was subsequently followed by the First Circuit 
Court in the Camerlin case and by the Supreme Court 
of Minnesota in the Allison case. It appears that there 
is now no question whatsoever but that the federal rule 
is that a plaintiff need only prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence facts sufficient to avoid a release for 
fr.aud or mutual mistake of fact. 
In a recent decision our Utah State Supre1ne Court 
has clearly indicated an intention to dep.art from prior 
niceties of distinction with regard to burden of proof 
between the preponderance of the evidence ru 1e, and 
the clear and convincing evidence rule. 
In re Swan's Estate, decided February 15, 1956, 
4 Ut. 2d, 277, 293 P. 2d 682, involved the burden of proof 
problem with respect to overcoming the presumption 
of fraud and undue influence upon a showing of confi-
dential relationship, procurement of a will and heirship 
in the will. In that case the contestant of the will clairned 
that the proponents of the will had the burden of estab-
lishing a lack of fraud and undue influence by clear 
and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court of Utah 
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• 
reversing its prior position in the case of J ardivne v. 
Archibald, 3 Ut. 2d 88, 279 P. 2d 454, adopted the pre-
ponderance of the evidence rule and rejected the clear 
and convincing evidence rule. We quote from said de-
CISion: 
"After careful study and consideration we 
conclude that this presumption shifts the burden 
on to the confidential advisor of pursuading or 
convincing the fact finder by a preponderance of 
the evidence that no fraud or undue influence 
was exerted, or in other words, he has the burden 
of convincing the fact finder from the evidence 
that it is more probable that he acted perfectly 
fair with his confidents; that he made complete 
disclosure of all material information available 
and took no unfair advantage of his superior 
position than that he exerted fraud or undue in-
fluence to obtain the benefits in question. ThiJs 
is contrary to our holding in the Jardine case, 
1rhich is supported by the California cases and 
so1ne other decl:Sions that clear and conv~nct"'ng 
eicz1dence to the contra·ry is necessary to overco1ne 
such p1·e szun pt~·o n. Tf' e reach this conclusi,on be-
cause we feel that the rule is 'lnO're clear and 
understandable than the rule requirz~ng clear and 
coJn;incz~ng el~-z!dence; that this rule is nzore apt to 
produce a just result and zs Jnore ge·nerally recog-
1n\~ed as the correct rule govern·ing th£s sttua.ti'o·n." 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED PLAIN-
TIFF TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT AND PROPERLY IN-
STRUCTED THE JURlr ON MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT. 
RulP 1 fl (h) lTt-ah Rules of Civil Procedure gives the 
trinl court- a \Yide diseretion in alhnYing an1endn1ents to 
eon f'ortn to the Pvidence. The trial court in the ease at 
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bar allowed plaintiff to amend so as to put in issue 
the question of mutual Inistake of fact. The evidence 
which was brought out at the trial clearly permitted 
the question ·of mutual mistake of f.act to be presented 
to the jury. The evidence which brought out this issue 
came in without objection by counsel for defendant. The 
evidence of which defendant complains merely had to 
do with whether or not the claim agent knew that pain 
and suffering is one ·of the elements of damages to which 
plaintiff is entitled under the F.E.L.A. This evidence 
pertains to the transaction between plaintiff and the 
claim agent, was proper cross-examination and was ma-
terial to show that the claim agent did not fully advise 
plaintiff as to is rights. It tends to corroborate plain-
tiff's testimony that the claim agent threatened him with 
the loss of his job if he would not accept the settlement. 
The following facts were thought to be important as 
to mutual mistake of fact by this Court in the Kirch-
gestner case, Supra, as stated at page 690: 
''The plaintiff had been examined by two 
doctors who had been unable to find anything 
wrong with him and one of whom had told him 
that he would be 'all right'. The plaintiff expessed 
to Sayger (claim agent) that he thought he was 
able to return to work. Dr. Fuller had assured 
Sayger that the plaintiff was able to return to 
work. Sayger testified that he did not know at 
that time that the plaintiff was suffering from a 
dis~abling hack injury and admitted that in 
making the settlement he (Sayger) acted upon 
that mistaken belief. The f.act that the amount 
of the settlement closely approximates what the 
plaintiff had lost in earnings is an indication that 
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both parties acted upon the belief that the plain-
tiff's sufferings were at an end or would be 
short-lived.'' 
And further at page 691 : 
"To tell a layman who has been injured that 
he will be about again in a short time is to do 
more than prophesy about his recovery. No doubt 
it is a forecast, but it is ordinarily more than a 
forecast; it is an assurance as to his present 
condition, and so understood.'' 
(Above quoted by court in Union Pacific Rail-
road Company v. Zimmer 197 P. 2d 363) 
In the case .at bar plaintiff had been released to 
return to \York by Dr. Hubbard. Plaintiff testified that 
at the time of the settle1nent he thought he would make 
a co1nplete recovery. He testified that his objection to 
1nerely accepting lost ,,~ages as a con1plete settlement 
\Yas that he ,,-as reeeiYing nothing for the p.ain and 
suffering he had had fro1n the date of the injury up to 
the ti1ne of the settlen1ent. The elailn agent Stephen 
testified that he kne'Y plaintiff had been released by the 
doctor and had returned to "~ork. He stated tltat as far 
a~ he kne'v plaintiff had no per1nanent disabilit:~. The 
fact that both plaintiff and the clain1 agent thought 
thnt plaintiff had only n ternporary disability \Yas clearly 
e~tahli~hPd hY thi~ PYidence and "-as fortified by the fact 
. . 
that tllP doet or had rt"lea~{?d plaintiff for duty. In addi-
tion, tlH-. fnet that th·e a1nount of the settle1nent 'vas 
idPn t i eal to tlH~ lo~t 'r.ngP~ of pin in tiff is another indica-
tion thnt both parti~·~ aeted upon the belief that plain·-
tirf·'H HnfferingH "rere nt an end or "Tould be short lived. 
It i~ re~pectfull~T subinittPd that this eYidence is ahuost 
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identical to the evidence which was approved by this 
court in the Kirchgestner case. 
As to the evidence that plaintiff had a permanent 
disability of 10% in his left shoulder one need only recall 
the testimony ·of Dr. R.eed Clegg who is a specialist in 
the field of orthopedics. The jury obviously believed the 
testimony of Dr. Clegg. Dr. Clegg testified that his 
examination showed that plaintiff had a permanent 
partial disability in the left shoulder of 10%. He further 
testified that the disability was caused by ''the fact that 
there is still slight weakness, there is .a tenderness, and 
that there is a deposit of bone about the shoulder joint.'' 
The deposit of bone about the shoulder joint appeared 
as a knob on the x-rays of Dr. Clegg. This knob appeared 
to he substantial and stood out in these x-r.ays. Dr. 
Clegg further testified that such a deposit was usually 
caused by trauma. Also in ansvver to a hypothetical 
question in which it was assumed that plaintiff had had 
no complaints or difficulty with the shoulder prior to 
the aecident and had had eomplaints since the time of 
the accident and with his condition as found by Dr. 
Clegg's examination, Dr. Clegg gave it as his opinion 
that the accident caused the disability from vvhich plain-
tiff is suffering. Plaintiff established the facts of the 
hypothetical question in his testimony. 
In regard to the witness presented by defendant, 
Dr. Hubbard, there is no evidence in the record from 
which defendant can n1ake a statement as it does in its 
brief that Dr. I-Iubbard was a disinterested witness. 
This court in the case of Mooney v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Western R. Co. (1950) 118 U. 307, 221 P. 2d 628, recog-
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nized the fact that this defendant has control over doc-
tors in the hospital ass-ociation. This case presented a 
question of forum non conveniens. In discussing the in-
convenience asserted by defendant this eourt stated at 
page 341: 
"Little weight need he given in this case to 
the state lines and lack of process as the wit-
nesses are all either employees of defendant or 
doctors closely associated with the company and 
all are available if paid ·at the same rate they 
would he paid for attendance in Denver.'' 
And again at page 354: 
"In non-fatal accidents where there is a 
question of the extent of the injury suffered the 
plaintiff is often dependent entirely on the evi-
dence of doctors employed by the railroad. The 
railroad not only employs the doctors who treat 
the injured, but have in their employ every type 
of expert in obtaining evidence * * *" 
In this case Dr. Hubbard ca1ne all the \Yay from 
Price, Utah, to testify on behalf of the railroad comp.any, 
and his demeanor on the \Yitness stand indicated very 
clearly that he was a biased \Yitness and \Yas very defi-
nitely interested in doing everything he could for the 
railroad company. The jury had the benefit of seeing 
the doctor on the \vitness stand and observing his de~ 
meanor. Dr. Hubbard's testin1ony \vas dian1etrically op-
posed to the testin1ony of Dr. Clegg. He testified that 
the bone deposit or callus as sho\\~1 on Dr. Clegg's 
x-ravs would not cause anY disabilitY and t.h.at everv 
., " . . 
person over the age of forty \vould haYe pain in his 
shoulders at extre1ne ranges of ntotion. Furthermore, he 
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refused to assume that plaintiff had any pain .at all in 
his shoulder after the dislocation had been reduced and 
even hesitated to state the plaintiff had any pain in the 
shoulder at the time the reduction was made even 
though he admitted that he administered an anaesthetic 
to plaintiff at the time of making said reduction. Dr. 
Hubbard testified that the x-r.ays which he took on the 
day of the accident showed the same bone callus which 
Dr. Clegg's x-rays showed so clearly, although even to 
the unpracticed eye there is no such appearance on these 
x-rays. (See exhibits P-3, P-4, D-5 and D-6). In addition 
to this Dr. Hubbard testified that the callus would not 
cause any disability whatsoever which was in direct 
conflict with the evidence of Dr. Clegg. Obviously, the 
jury believed Dr. Clegg over Dr. Hubbard and dis-
credited the evidence of Dr. Hubbard as it was entitled to 
do. 
The evidence cle.arly showed that there was a mis-
take in the mind of DT. Hubbard, Stephen and plaintiff 
as to the fact that plaintiff had a permanent disability in 
his left shoulder. Plaintiff testified that he had never 
in his life had any symptoms or tr·ouble in his left shoul-
der prior to the accident and that he had trouble in 
said shoulder from the date of the accident to the present 
time. Plaintiff had been assured by the doctor that there 
was nothing wrong with the shoulder and had no idea 
whatsoever that the shoulder would not get completely 
well. The evidence which the jury chose to believe as to 
the permanent disability in plaintiff's shoulder, was the 
evidence of Dr. Clegg. Dr. Clegg gave it as his opinion 
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that plaintiff had a 10% permanent partial disability 
in his left shoulder. 
The evidence which c.ame in without objection from 
defendant clearly showed a mutual mistake of fact, and 
the trial court properly allowed plaintiff to amend his 
complaint to conform to the evidence and properly sub-
mitted this issue to the jury. 
POINT III. 
THE GROSS UNFAIRNESS OF A SETTLEMENT IS A 
PROPER MATTER FOR THE JURY TO CONSIDER IN CON-
NECTION WITH PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE AS TO UNDUE 
INFLUEN·CE EXERCISED UPON HIM BY DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIM AGENT. 
It has been generally recognized as a principle of 
law that an unconscionable or unfair contract gives rise to 
an inference of fraud. Specifically, a recent F.E.L.~\. 
case involving a question as to validit~~ of .a release is 
squarely in point on the subject presented in defendant's 
Point III. This is the case of Seaboard Ai'r Li-ne Railroad 
Company v. G~ll, Fourth Circuit (1955), 227 F. 2d 64, 
which was an action involving a release "\Yhere plaintiff 
claimed that fraud and undue influence "\Yere used in 
obtaining the release. The trial court instructed the jury 
that gross inadequacy of consideration alone is sufficient 
evidence to sustain an allegation of fraud and undue 
influence provided that the eonsideration is so inade-
quate as to shock the conscience ·or the. n1oral sense of 
right and wrong. Also the court instructed that inade-
quacy of consideration, although not gross~ is a proper 
circurn~tanee to be considered upon the issue of fraud in 
connection 'vith other evidence .and circun1stances suf-
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ficient to show fraud. The Circuit Court in reviewing 
this instruction stated that it was not erroneous on the 
ground that it averted the jury's attention from other 
evidence in the case if the jury found that the amounts 
paid were grossly inadequate. 
The argument m.ade by counsel for plaintiff of which 
the defendant complains was to the effect that the gross 
inadequacy of the consideration paid plaintiff for his 
injury gave credance to and supported the o·ther evidence 
of plaintiff that the claim agent had threatened him 
with the loss of his job if he would not accept the 
settle·ment. This argument was based on the Gill case 
and was perfectly proper under that case. Of course, 
under the Gill case it would be improper to instruct the 
jury that they could not consider the fairness or un-
fairness ·of the consideration paid for the release. Cer-
tainly, if the consideration had been fair and just 
defendant would be entitled to have the jury use this 
in support of its testimony that no fraud or undue in-
fluence was practiced on plaintiff. 
The evidence shows that plaintiff had received a 
severe initial injury by being thrown from the bed of 
the truck. In addition to the dislocation of the left 
shoulder, he was hit in the mouth and chin, cut his eye 
and several teeth were loosened. He could hardly eat 
when he was afterwards in the hospital because of this 
(R. 24). Subsequent to the accident, plaintiff suffered 
severe pain while in the hospital, and from the time the 
shoulder was reduced and his arm strapped to his side 
and later put in splints plaintiff suffered continuou::; 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
pain in his left shoulder. The pain did not leave plaintiff 
after he returned home and hadn't left him to the date 
of the trial. Although plaintiff felt that he would make 
a complete recovery, he felt that the offer of settlement 
for lost wages alone was grossly unfair because it took 
no account whatsoever ·of the experience he had gone 
through and the great pain and suffering he had endured. 
His resistence to the offer made by the claim agent 
was beaten down by the threat that plaintiff would lose 
his j·ob if he did not accept this offer. Certainly, it is 
common sense that the jury could consider the gross 
inadequacy of the consideration paid for the release as 
corroboration of the evidence that the claim agent had 
p·racticed fraud and undue influence upon plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the trial court acted properly in 
instructing the jury that plaintiff's burden ·of proving 
fraud and mutual mistake of fact "\Yas by a preponder-
ance of the evidence inas1nuch as this ru1e has been 
adopted by the Federal Courts subsequent to the Kirch-
gestner case. In addition, the evidence produced .at the 
trial clearly justified the allo"\Yance of plaintiff's ainend-
ment to conform to the proof as to n1utual n1istake of 
fact. ·The evidence heretofore outlined "\Yas clearly the 
same type of evidence that "\Yas relied on by this Court 
in the l{irehgestner case in supporting a finding of 
n1utnal n1istake of fact. Furthern1orE\ the jury could 
very properly consider the gross inadequacy of the set-
tlPtnent aH corroborating the other eYidence surrounding 
the proenre1nent of the relea~e in deter1nining that the 
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claim agent had exercised fr.aud and undue influence 
upon plaintiff in obtaining the settlement. For the 
reasons as set forth herein we respectfully submit that 
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
JOHN L. BLACK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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